St. John's Law Review
Volume 49, Fall 1974, Number 1

Article 2

Insider Liability Under Rule 10b-5--The Current State of the Law
Victor M. Rosenzweig

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

INSIDER LIABILITY UNDER RULE 10b-5
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
VICrOR M. RoSENZWEM*

Of the rules adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1
the most important and far-reaching is rule lOb-5. 2 Based on the theory
that the market for a security should reflect the judgments of purchasers and sellers with equal access to all relevant information, rule
lOb-5 is principally directed at the person who has access to more
information than the average purchaser or seller -the insider.3 However, it is not always clear which persons are considered insiders for
the purposes of rule 10b-5; nor is it clear what acts or omissions give
rise to liability, or the extent of such liability, under the rule. What
has become increasingly dear is that the application of the rule has
signaled an "Era of Anticipation" for every individual involved in a
securities transaction covered by 1b-5.4
WHO IS AN INSIDER?
and directors,5 controlling

stockholders of the
Corporate officers
issuer 6 and the issuer itself are all considered "insiders" for the pur* B .BA., College of the City of New York, 1959; J.D., New York University School of
Law, 1962. Member of the New York Bar. Co-author, with Robert L. Frome, of SALES
OF SEcuRrrrES By Co, oRATE INsmERs-TnE ImpACr OF THE 140 SnmUs (PLI 1975).
115 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any

means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of a national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
3 Liability under rule lOb-5 flows from
the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal
benefit of anyone, and... the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he
is dealing.
In re Cady, Roberts $:Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (footnote omitted).
4 Rule lOb-5 covers unregistered securities as well as securities registered on a national
exchange. In fact, a significant percentage of all litigation instituted under lOb-5 arises
from direct face-to-face transactions involving securities of dosely held corporations not
actively traded in any market.
5 Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (SD.N.Y. 1967).
6Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (Ist Cir. 1966).
7 Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
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poses of rule lOb-5. Clearly, these individuals would have access to
more information than the average purchaser or seller. However, the
scope of the term "insider" is not limited to this enumerated class of
individuals. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,8 for example, a company engineer, two company geologists, an attorney, and an office manager were all considered insiders within the broad scope of lOb-5. 9
A broker-dealer may be liable under rule lOb-510 for a wide variety
of misrepresentations or omissions concerning stock he is trading for
a customer. A few of the litigated situations peculiar to a brokercustomer relationship have involved misrepresentations of the margin
on which the stock may be purchased," misrepresenting outstanding
securities as a new issue, 12 omissions as to the availability of a better
price for purchase of the security, 13 and domination of the market by
the broker-dealer.' 4
Nor have securities lawyers escaped the web of liability under
lOb-5. It had generally been assumed that lawyers had no liability in
connection with securities transactions other than liability to their
clients for malpractice or other negligent conduct.15 However, in SEC
v. National Student Marketing Corp.,16 two law firms themselves were
charged with violations of the antifraud provisions for the manner in
which they had represented two merger partners by failing to disclose
certain adverse financial information. 17 Apparently, the SEC is taking
the position that an attorney's first duty when he learns a client is acting improperly is to the public, rather than to his client.'8 Such a view
8 401

F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
9 The court considered sales made in the names of insiders' wives as having been made
by the insiders, since any other approach would have been "unrealistic." Id. at 841.
10 The broker-dealer may be concurrently liable under rule 15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240cl-2
(1974). For a discussion of the special problems of underwriters, see Freund & Hacker,
Cutting Up the Humble Pie: A Practical Approach to Apportioning Litigation Risks
Among Underwriters, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 461 (1974).
"1 Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1956).
12 In re Indiana State Sec. Corp., 38 S.E.C. 118 (1957).
13 SEC v. Seaboard Sec. Corp., CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP. $ 91,697 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 1966).
14 In re S.T. Jackson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 631 (1950).
15 Naturally, when attorneys acted in other capacities, such as officer or director, they
could be subject to liability under lOb-5. In addition, the standard of conduct applicable
to them might, in certain instances, be higher than that applicable to laymen. See Escott v.
BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
16 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973).
17 The complaint alleged that the firms had knowledge that auditors had uncovered
certain inaccurate information in previously certified financial statements. Despite the
foregoing, proxy statements were distributed without mentioning the changes suggested
by the auditors. Both law firms opined that all steps required to consummate the merger
had been validly taken. Id. at 292-94.
18 This position appears to contradict the traditional concept that an attorney is an
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of attorney responsibility was given further credence in Myerhofer v.
Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 9 when the Second Circuit held
that a lawyer did not violate the legal canons of ethics requiring him
to preserve a client's confidences where he had reported his client's
allegedly improper actions to both the SEC and adversary counsel.20
Moreover, liability can attach to those who are not themselves
closely associated with an issuer if they make use of nonpublic information gleaned from those traditionally considered insiders. Such
"tippee" liability was demonstrated in Shapiro v. MerrillLynch, Pierce,
Fenner& Smith,21 where Merrill Lynch, underwriter for an upcoming
issue of Douglas Aircraft debentures, informed a number of its institutional customers that Douglas' earnings would be considerably lower
than expected. When these "tippees" sold large blocks of Douglas stock
before public release of the earnings forecast, the court recognized a
valid lOb-5 action against both Merrill Lynch and its tippees.22
The question becomes more difficult as the relationship between
the tipper and tippee becomes more remote, if the disclosure takes
the form of "informed speculation" rather than hard factual information, and if the tippee is not aware that the tip involves any breach
of trust. Thus, one who by chance overhears a conversation and picks
up certain confidential information would probably not be included
in the class of persons considered tippees. Certainly, it would be difficult to prove that information was acquired in this manner. Such
"locker room" disclosures involve information which, by the nature
of the conversation overheard, would probably be considered a matter
of public knowledge; it is the "board room" disclosure which may
lead to liability under lOb-5.
agent and that his first duty is to act in a fiduciary manner on behalf of his client and
to maintain strict confidence as to any information of a privileged nature that the client
reveals. See ABA CODE OF PRoFEssoNAL REPoNsIBILrY DR 4-101.
19497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974).
2o The court appeared to rely, however, on the fact that the attorney made the disclosure to defend himself against charges of wrongdoing, and reasoned that the canons
permit such self defense. Id. at 1195-96.
21495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
22 In reaching its conclusion, the Shapiro court noted that
[s]ince upon the admitted facts before us the selling defendants [tippees] knew
or should have known of the confidential corporate source of the revised earnings
information and they knew of its non-public nature, they were under a duty not
to trade in Douglas stock without publicly disclosing such information.
Id. at 238.
The court relied in part upon the holding in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446
F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), where a tipper was held liable for
the profits of his tippees. See generally Note, Deterrence of Tippee Trading Under Rule
10b-5, 38 U. Cm. L. Ry. 372 (1971); Note, Liability of "Tippees" Under Rule 10b-5 of the
SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, 80 WASw. & LEE L. REv. 527-47 (1973).
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In short, when one realizes that the courts are concerned with
safeguarding against that inherent unfairness exhibited when an individual takes advantage of those with whom he is dealingi2 it appears
that anyone who is in a unique position of access to information of
relevance to a securities transaction may be an "insider" for purposes
of liability under rule lOb-5.24
1Ob-5?
Although rule lOb-5 requires truthful disclosure of "material
facts," 25 the distinction between fact and opinion for the purposes of
determining what information must be disclosed under lOb-5 is often
difficult to discern. "Educated guesses," "informed opinions," and "reliable predictions" cannot strictly be classified as facts, but may nevertheless lead to liability.20 Furthermore, the courts have employed differing formulas in defining what constitutes "material" information.
While most definitions focus on whether the information would affect
the decisions of a reasonable investor,2 7 several decisions indicate that
the standards used to determine materiality will differ with the position of the plaintiff. In List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,28 judgment was
entered in favor of the defendant where the plaintiff, Albert List, was
a well-known financier. In Kohler v. Kohler Co., 29 the court denied
recovery where the plaintiff had been an executive of the defendant
WHAT CONSnTUTES A VIOLATION OF RULE

23 See note 3 supra.
24 In addition to individuals, corporations themselves may be held in violation of
lOb-5. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,

404 U.S. 1004 (1971), where a corporation was held liable for issuing a misleading press
release. It has been suggested that public companies that repurchase their own stock to
"go private" may be liable under lOb-5 as well. SEC Commissioner A. A. Sommer recently
indicated that the practice of "squeezing out" minority stockholders is both illegal and
unethical under the antifraud provisions of the securities law. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1974,
at 51, col. 2.
25 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(2) (1974).
26 See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1971). Leasco was attracted to the possibility of a merger with the Reliance Insurance Co.
(Reliance) because of the large amount of cash that Reliance possessed above that required to meet its contingent liabilities to its shareholders. Leasco was unsure of the
exact amount of this "surplus surplus" and could only estimate it from published reports
which later proved inaccurate. Citing its inability to determine adequately the amount of
such surplus, Leasco made no mention of it in its exchange offer registration statement.
Nonetheless, the court held that it should have disclosed its opinion regarding the existence of the surplus (of which it was certain) with an appropriate "hedge" clause as to
its amount. Although the case was decided under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), on this issue, the decision is equally applicable to rule lob-5.
27 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (Ist Cir. 1966); List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
28 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
29 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
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company for over twenty years. The court found that the defendant
could fairly deal with [the plaintiff] who had had many years of
intimate acquaintance with the affairs of the corporation,... who
had extrinsic sources of sound business advice, and who himself was
promoting a speedy sale, in a manner that might not be fair if plaintiff had been a novice to stock transactions or the corporation's
activities.3 0
Generally, it is difficult to determine whether a given piece of information is material without examining additional facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction. However, once such subjective
considerations are deemed necessary in deciding the issue, clarity and
uniformity become impossible and materiality will continue to be the
critical issue in most lOb-5 litigation."'
An objective analysis of the requisite elements of a lOb-5 violation
is further confounded when reliance32 and causation are considered.
For the most part, courts have not considered reliance, causation and
materiality as strictly separate elements, and decisions have been based
upon the presence of different combinations of these elements. The
Second Circuit, combining reliance and materiality, has suggested that
"[t]he proper test is whether the plaintiff would have been influenced
to act differently than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to
him the undisclosed fact." 3 Obviously, the court was implying that the
undisclosed fact must have been sufficiently material to have caused
the plaintiff to rely on it and, therefore, be misled. Less helpful is the
seemingly implied tautology that the reasonableness of the plaintiff's
reliance will be determined by the materiality of the defendant's statements. Indeed, a court has recently held that reliance can be presumed
from a finding of materiality,34 while, in cases of affirmative misrepresentation, materiality can be implied from a finding of reliance.8 5
so Id.at 642.
312 A. BaouramG, SECUITS LAw: FRAuD- SEC Rum lOb-5 202 (1971). See generally
Jacobs, What is a Misleading Statement or Omission Under Rule lOb-57, 42 FoRD.L. REv.
243 (1973).
32 Although rule lOb-5 omits any reference to reliance, it has been held that reliance
is required for a plaintiff to recover damages for a private injury. Rogen v. Ilikon Corp.,
361 F.2d 260 (Ist Cir. 1966); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965). However, a showing of reliance is not required in an action brought
by the SEC seeking an injunction to prevent further fraudulent practices. N. Sims Organ &
Co. v. SEC, 293 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 968 (1962). Nor is reliance
required in a nondisclosure situation, whether or not the parties are dealing face to face.
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 US. 128 (1972).
33 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965).
34 Dorfman v. First Boston Corp. - F. Supp. - (E.D. Pa. 1974), discussed in 249 B.N.A.
SEc, REG. L. REP. A-7, Apr. 24, 1974.
35 Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
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Nor can an analysis of causation be separated from the concepts
of materiality and reliance. If the nondisclosure or misstatement is material and if the plaintiff has relied on it to his detriment, causation
need not be independently considered. Even in cases where there is
no actual reliance, the causation requirement may be satisfied by a
showing that the defendant failed in his duty to disclose material information. Furthermore, in what appears to be the most far-reaching
development in this area, the Second Circuit held this year that such
nondisclosure results in liability not only to the purchasers of the actual shares sold by defendants, but to all persons "who, during the
same period . . . purchased . . . stock in the open market without
knowledge of the material inside information which was in the possession of defendants."3 6
Clearly, materiality, reliance and causation are closely connected
and there exists a great deal of overlap in considering each element.
Apparently, the more flagrant or deliberate the lOb-5 violation, the
weaker the connective link needs to be.3 7 Less clear is the impact of
these "requirements" on insiders. Despite the courts' recognition of
the interrelationships among materiality, reliance and causation, these
elements themselves remain undefined. Insiders continue to be faced
with potential liability for failing to disclose or misrepresenting a fact
or opinion, the materiality of which will be subjectively determined
by the circumstances surrounding each transaction, and which need
neither be directly relied upon nor directly cause plaintiffs' injuries.
REQUIREM[ENT OF THE INTENT TO DEFRAUD

In Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 8 8 Judge Frank ob-

served in dictum that, to maintain an action under rule 10b-5, the
plaintiff must show an "ingredient of fraud."3 9 This view was followed
by the Second Circuit in Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co. 4 0 which
held that "[i]t is insufficient to allege mere negligence" 41 and that
36 Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 241 (2d Cir. 1974)
(footnote omitted). See also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
RULE lOb-5 202 (1971).
87 See 2 A. BRomBERO, SEcUmrrms LAW: FRAuD -SEC
38 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
891d. at 787. The court distinguished between an action brought under the Securities
Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), requiring no proof of fraud or deceit and an action
brought under the Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), where "proof
of fraud is required .... 188 F.2d at 786.
40 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971).
41 Id. at 445 (citations omitted). In dismissing the plaintiff's complaint, the court
noted that
plaintiffs' claim is nothing more than a garden-variety customer's suit against a
broker for breach of contract, which cannot be bootstrapped into an alleged
violation of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, or Rule lOb-5, in the absence of an
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nothing less than reckless disregard of the truth would support a lOb-5
action. However, many courts have held that no evil motive or intent
to deceive need be proved.
In Kohler v. Kohler Co.,42 the plaintiff alleged that he had been
induced to sell his stock in the defendant company at less than its fair
market value by virtue of the misrepresentations and omissions of the
company's accountant. 4 8 In concluding that the plaintiff stated a valid
lOb-5 action, the Seventh Circuit declared that neither an intent to
deceive nor knowledge of falsity are required for liability as an in4 5 the Ninth Circuit echoed this
sider.44 In Ellis v. Carter,
view in interpreting the statutory language of the provision:
Section 10(b) speaks in terms of the use of "any manipulative device
or contrivance" in contravention of rules and regulations as might
be prescribed by the Commission. It would have been difficult to
frame the authority to prescribe regulations in broader terms. Had
Congress intended to limit this authority to regulations proscribing
common-law fraud, it would probably have said so. We see no reason
to go beyond the plain meaning of the word "any", indicating that
the use of manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances of
whatever kind may be forbidden, to construe the statute as if it
read "any fraudulent" devices 4 6
The Second Circuit has recognized that, when the lOb-5 action takes
the form of injunctive proceedings by the SEC, no showing of scienter
47
is required.
Generally, those courts which have voiced acceptance of a negligence standard have done so in cases where there has been scienter as
allegation of facts amounting to scienter, intent to defraud, reckless disregard for
the truth, or knowing use of a device, scheme or artifice to defraud.
Id. (emphasis in original).
42 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
48 Id. at 636-37.
44 The court concluded that "knowledge of the falsity or misleading character of a

statement and a bad faith intent to mislead or misrepresent are not required to prove a
violation of the statute ...." Id. at 637.
45 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
46 Id. at 274.
47 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969). The Second Circuit noted that
a review of other sections of the Act from which Rule lOb-5 seems to have been
drawn suggests that implementation of a standard of conduct that encompasses
negligence as well as active fraud comports with the administrative and the
legislative purposes underlying the Rule. Finally we note that this position is
not... irreconcilable with previous language in this circuit because "some form
of the traditional scienter requirements," ...

sometimes defined as "fraud," . ..

is preserved. This requirement, whether it be termed lack of diligence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct, remains implicit in this standard ....

Id. at 855 (footnotes, citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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well. In Myzel v. Fields,48 the Eighth Circuit applied a negligence standard where the insiders purchased stock after knowingly misrepresenting the state of the corporation's finances. 49 Even the Ellis decision
has been criticized as not completely eliminating a scienter requirement." Apparently, an insider's liability rests upon some middle
ground requiring some degree of scienter rather than a showing of
mere negligence, but not necessarily requiring all the traditional elements of common law fraud.51 As with the elements of materiality,
causation and reliance, the requirements of scienter and/or negligence
must be viewed in light of the particular facts of each alleged violation. The more active the participation by the violating insider, the
higher the standard of care to which the insider will be held; the more
flagrant the violation, the less stringent the requirement of "some ele52
ment" of fraud.
STANDING -

TiE PURCHASE

OR

SALE

REQUIREMENT

Although rule lOb-5 prohibits the employment of deceptive and
manipulative practices "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security,"5 3 the interpretation of this phrase has been left to the courts
in determining who can bring an action under lOb-5. Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp. 4 established that a lOb-5 action could only be
maintained if there were an actual purchase or sale.5 5 To obtain relief
under lOb-5, then, it is not enough that the material information withheld or misstated would have influenced a plaintiff to purchase or sell
48 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
49 See Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562, 563 (1972), where the
author indicates that whenever a court has determined that negligence is sufficient, it has
rarely been crucial to their decision.
50 One commentator has argued that the facts in Ellis were sufficient to establish
actual knowledge. Id. at 584.
51 In Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 US. 852
(1970), the Eighth Circuit was concerned with determining whether a lob-5 action was
barred by the statute of limitations. In deciding that the Arkansas Blue Sky Law, Amr.
STAT. ANN. § 1256(e) (1966), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1973), was controlling, the court
noted that the Blue Sky Law resembled lOb-5 rather than common law fraud in that

lob-5 applied to "negligent as well as knowing and intentional misrepresentations." Id.
at 1238. See also Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514
(10th Cir. 1973); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
52 For a full discussion of such a flexible standard, see Mann, Rule 10b-5: Evolution
of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter,
45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1206 (1970).
58 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(3) (1974).
54 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
55 The court noted that § 10(b) was directed solely at that type of misrepresentation

or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities rather
than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs and that rule lOb-5 extended
protection only to the defrauded purchaser or seller. Id. at 464. This view was reaffirmed

in Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969).
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if he remained out of the market. Accordingly, it has been generally
accepted that the 10b-5 plaintiff must be either a buyer or seller of
the security, and the illegal act must have been in connection with the
plaintiff's purchase or sale. However, some courts have not hesitated
to overlook the absence of a traditional purchase or sale and find a
"constructive" transaction to preserve the integrity of lOb-5.
Even the Second Circuit, which enunciated the Birnbaum rule,
has held that a minority shareholder of a corporation involved in a
short-form merger was a "forced seller" of his stock since, although he
retained possession of his certificates, after the merger he had no choice
except to have them converted into shares in the surviving corporation
or have them appraised.56 The erosion of this dubious doctrine has
further been reinforced by the same court in its recent decision in
Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.5 7 There it was held that section
10(b) applies equally to fraudulent management practices relating to
a potential merger or acquisition and is not limited to the type of
fraud traditionallyassociated with the purchase and sale of securities."8
Primary reliance was placed on the Supreme Court's decision in
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Insurance
Co., " wherein it was stated:
We agree that Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions which constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement. But we read § 10(b) to mean that Congress meant to bar
deceptive devices and contrivances in the purchase or sale of securities whether conducted in the organized markets or face to face. 60
The Schlick court upheld a complaint founded upon sections 10(b)
and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, although on its face the
complaint involved a claim that a majority shareholder had fraudulently "squeezed out," in a merger, the minority shareholder interests
for grossly inadequate consideration, 'despite the fact that the terms
of the merger were fully disclosed in the proxy material.
The corporate defendant acquired a 53 percent interest in the
acquiree over a two-year period and was able to place six of its own
directors on the acquiree's nine-person board. Thereafter, the defendant-parent company allegedly embarked on a course of conduct
56 Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
See also International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974), where the
court considered a stock dividend a "sale' for lOb-5 standing.
57 Civil No. 73-2677 (2d Cir., Oct. 31, 1974).
c8 Id. at 5854.

59 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
CO ld. at 12.
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wherein the market price of the acquiree's stock was manipulated and
depressed to enable the defendant to propose and approve an artificial
and unfair exchange ratio for the 47 percent minority of the acquiree.
The lower court held that the gravamen of the complaint was a claim of
an unfair merger - one ripe for state adjudication, but not the kind of
violation that the federal statutes were designed to remedy. 1 However,
the Second Circuit disagreed, apparently because the section 10(b)
claim contained requisite allegations as to the effectuation of a scheme
to defraud which included market manipulation.
Furthermore, in upholding the section 14(a) claim, based upon
a false and misleading proxy statement, it was of no moment to the
court that the defendant-parent had sufficient votes to effect the merger
irrespective of any omissions in the proxy statement. The court noted:
The equities call for protection of the minority shareholder when
he is the most helpless, as when neither disinterested director nor
disinterested shareholder voting exists as a safeguard. To require
strict causation would "sanction all manner of fraud and overreaching in the fortuitous circumstance that a controlling shareholder exists." 62
Thus, the Second Circuit is virtually insisting on full disclosure
of an allegedly unfair exchange ratio, perhaps in the hope that "even
a rapacious controlling management" would not "want its dirty linen
out on the line and thereby expose itself to suit. .. ."3 Accordingly,
it now appears that, in view of the current trend of "squeeze-outs"
of minority shareholders at low market prices, the courts in the Second
Circuit can be expected to liberally apply rule lOb-5 and other federal statutes to protect minority interests, even in the case of an artfully drawn proxy statement which makes full disclosure - except, of
course, for admitting the alleged penultimate facts, i.e., the scheme,
the manipulation, and the unfair exchange ratio.
One district court has gone so far as to state that a sale was not
a necessary condition for a lOb-5 suit, finding a legislative intent to
protect agreements to buy and sell as well as completed sales, provided
damages can be shown.6 4 In Eason v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp.,65 the Seventh Circuit found that shareholders who individually
guaranteed certain liabilities which the corporation had assumed in
purchasing a franchise from the defendants could bring a lOb-5 action
61 Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., Civil No. 73-1467 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 26, 1973).
62 Civil No. 73-2677, at 5861 (2d Cir., Oct. 31, 1974).
63 Id. at 5862.
64 Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
65 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973). cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
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for fraud. Although neither purchasers nor sellers of a security, the
court held that the plaintiffs were among that "special class" of investors protected by rule lOb-5. 66
Nevertheless, a number of courts apparently continue to follow
the judicial standing requirement imposed by Birnbaum.7 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has allowed confusion to prevail by declining to review either the Seventh Circuit's repudiation of the Birnbaum
doctrine 68 or the Third Circuit's decision to adhere to it.69 Of course,
there is no such confusion relating to a lOb-5 action seeking injunctive
relief, whether brought by the SEC or an individual. In either case,
the plaintiff need be neither an actual nor constructive purchaser or
70
seller.
If, under ordinary circumstances, the plaintiff must be a buyer or
seller to maintain an action under lOb-5, the question then arises
whether the defendant may be liable under the rule without being a
buyer or seller of the securities. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,71
the Second Circuit confronted this question in determining whether a
corporation violated lOb-5 by merely issuing a deceptive press release.7 2
Answering in the affirmative, the court construed the "in connection
with" requirement broadly and held that this clause was satisfied whenever the defendant-insider employed a device
of a sort that would cause reasonable investors to rely thereon, and,
in connection therewith, so relying, cause them to purchase or sell
a corporation's securities. There is no indication that Congress in06Id. at 659-61.
G7 See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974); James v. Gerber
Products Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973); Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d
339 (9th Cir. 1972). But see Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th
Cir. 1973). For a detailed criticism of the purchaser-seller requirement, see Lowenfels,
Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968).
08 Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
69 Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 960 (1974).
70 See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (interpretation of the statutory
role of the SEC); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 898 U.S. 950
(1970) (private party has standing to seek injunctive relief if neither a purchaser nor
seller, provided there exists a causal connection between alleged violation and injury);
accord, Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1969); Mutual Shares Corp. v.
Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
71401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
72 In an attempt to quell rumors that a major ore strike was in the making, Texas

Gulf Sulphur issued a press release which, in effect, labeled the reports as exaggerated
speculation. However, one day after issuing the press release, the company did in fact
make a major ore strike. The SEC alleged that Texas Gulf Sulphur deliberately misstated
preliminary drilling reports in the press release to quell the rumors, rather than accurately report the preliminary findings already in their possession and upon which the
rumors were based. Id. at 843-47.
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tended that the corporation or persons responsible for the issuance
of a misleading statement would not violate the section unless they

engaged in related securities transactions or otherwise acted with
wrongful motives ....
73
In Heit v. Weitzen,74 the court found the defendant liable for issuing
a misleading financial statement and flatly stated that "[t]here is no
necessity for contemporaneous trading in securities by insiders or by
5
the corporation itelf [sic]."7
In sum, it would appear that rule lOb-5 may be successfully invoked against persons or corporations who are neither purchasers nor
sellers, but who, as "insiders," are responsible for misrepresentations
or omissions which have resulted in injury to the deceived plaintiff.
On the other hand, in the absence of a request for only injunctive
relief, the injured plaintiff must first establish proper standing as an
actual, or "constructive," purchaser or seller of securities.
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES AND EXTENT OF LL

ILIT

In theory, damages are assessed under lOb-5 to make the rule an
effective deterrent and to award the prudent investor an amount that
equals the loss he has suffered through the conduct of the insider.
However, both the nature and the extent of such damages have defied
attempts at uniform classification.70
In the initial finding of an implied private cause of action under
rule lOb-5, the court in Kardon v. National Gypsum CO.7 7 held that disregard of the statute was a tort and, as such, the offending insider was
required to compensate individual plaintiffs for their injuries.1 8 However, later decisions have implied that merely compensating the prudent investor does not provide an effective deterrent. Accordingly, in
order to insure that no insider profits from his transaction, the courts
73 Id. at 860.
14 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
75 Id. at 913. See text accompanying notes 5-24 supra for a discussion of who is liable
under lOb-5.
76 See Note, Damages to Uninformed Traders for Insider Trading on Impersonal
Exchanges, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 299 (1974); Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5
Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. Ruv. 371 (1974); Note, Measurement of Damages in Private Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 165; Note,
Securities Regulation -Damages for SEC Rule 10b-5 Violations, 49 TEx. L. Ray. 1141
(1971).
7769 F. Supp. 512 (ED. Pa. 1946).
78 Id. at 513, citing R.SrATEMENT or ToRTs § 286 (1934). However, it must be assumed
that the defrauded plaintiff has dealt directly with the insider since such a tort theory
of liability would seem to require a showing that a "particular" interest has been invaded
and a "particular" harm has resulted. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToM § 286 (1965);
Note, Damages to Uninformed Traders for Insider Trading on Impersonal Exchanges,
74 COLuM. L. Rav. 299, 303 (1974).
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have generally ordered disgorgement of all profits earned as a result
of insider trading.79 The Second Circuit has gone so far as to hold that
an insider who purchased securities and profited from his use of nonpublic information was required to disgorge not only the actual profits
realized when he later sold the securities, but also the "paper" profits
he had achieved prior to the date of the actual sale.80 This court appears to be holding that once public disclosure is made and all investors
are trading on an equal footing, the violator must bear the risk of
the market himself as part of his measure of damages under 101>5.
In direct face-to-face transactions, such as in Kardon, compensating the injured party is a practical and fair deterrent to insider trading. If the insider actually profits from his illegal transaction, perhaps
preserving the integrity of 1015's deterrent effect should outweigh the
defendant's "over-compensating" the defrauded plaintiff by requiring
a disgorgement of profits. However, when the insider is required to
compensate all traders affected directly or indirectly by his lOb-5 violation, and the level of potential damages becomes staggering,81 one
could question whether the elements of just compensation and disgorgement of profits may have been subordinated to the courts' quest for
an effective deterrent against unfair use of inside information.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation8 2 is illustrative. Texas Gulf Sulphur issued a misleading press release concerning an ore strike made in Canada on April 12th. The
curative release giving all of the correct facts was made available on
April 16th. However, the court held that anyone who sold between
April 16th and April 20th was still selling based on the misleading
information given out on April 12th. Thus, the measure of damages
was held to be the difference in cost that would have enabled a reasonable investor to reacquire Texas Gulf Sulphur securities within a
79 See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); Myzel v.
Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Janigan v. Taylor,
344 F.2d 781 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 353
F. Supp. 795 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
80 SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974). The court reasoned that
a contrary holding would create a serious anomaly that might encourage insider
trading. To require disgorgement only of actual profits in cases where the price
of the stock subsequently fell would create a heads-I-win-tails-you-lose opportunity for the violator; he could keep subsequent profits but not suffer subsequent losses. Such a rule would emasculate the deterrent effect of Rule lOb-5.
Id. at 1309.
81 See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 241-42 (2d Cir.
1974), where the court discusses the impact of damage awards in private actions brought
under lob-5.
82 Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971).
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reasonable time after the curative release had been fully disseminated.3
Furthermore, the court arbitrarily concluded that the measure of damages should be the highest price of Texas Gulf Sulphur stock during
the nine following days less the selling price of the shares.8 4 However
just the ruling may have been in compensating defrauded traders, it
must be remembered that there existed no profits to be disgorged in
compensation since the defendant had never traded on such "inside
information."5
Conceding the efficacy of the deterrent element of lOb-5 damages, 8
the question arises as to whether such extensive damages are, in effect,
punitive and therefore at odds with section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act,8 7 which limits recovery to actual damages suffered by a
defrauded plaintiff. Although the question has not been directly answered, courts have disallowed specific requests for punitive damages,
holding that punitive damages per se are not authorized in private
lOb-5 actions.8 8
The extent of an insider's liability is further complicated by a
realization that pursuit of a lOb-5 claim does not preclude traditional
common law actions for fraud or state actions regulating deceptive
practices in securities transactions.8 9 In Diamond v. Oreamuno,9 0 the
New York Court of Appeals granted shareholders standing to bring a
derivative suit against corporate directors who allegedly breached their
fiduciary duty to the corporation by trading on inside information. In
Schein v. Chasen,91 the Second Circuit permitted corporate sharehold88 Id. at

105.

84 Id. Texas Gulf Sulphur estimated the measure of damages under such a ruling as

approaching 14 million dollars.
85 See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra.
86 Of course, continued lOb-5 litigation itself tends to refute such an assumption.
87 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1970).
88 See, e.g., deHass v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970); Green v.
Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968); and Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216 F. Supp.
469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), where the courts interpreted section 28(a) to preclude plaintiffs' requests for punitive damages.
89 Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act provides in pertinent part:
The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and
all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity ....
Nothing
in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any
agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any security or any
person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the
rules and regulations thereunder.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1970).
90 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). The plaintiffs brought their
suit under N.Y. Bus. Coas. LAw § 626(b) (McKinney 1963), which authorizes such derivative actions.
91478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 42 U.SJL.W. 4603 (U.S. April 29, 1974). The
Supreme Court remanded to the Second Circuit to reconsider the efficacy of interpreting
Florida law rather than seeking a certification of the question by the Florida Supreme
Court.
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ers to bring a derivative suit against both the corporate executive who
conveyed inside information concerning anticipated earnings and the
broker who, having received the "tip," sold over 80,000 shares of stock
in the corporation for two mutual fund clients. Without alleging any
prior agreement between the executive and the broker, the plaintiffs
claimed that each breached a fiduciary duty owed to the shareholders.
Furthermore, the Schein court, in finding the defendants jointly
and severably liable for the dissemination and misuse of corporate information, 92 considered the tipper-tippee relationship to constitute a
"common enterprise." Through the use of this fiction, the court cloaked
the tippee with the same fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiffs by the
corporate executive (defendant-tipper), and effectively eliminated the
requirement that the defendants be unjustly enriched. The net effect
of Diamond and Schein has been to provide a state common law liability parallel to the federal lOb-5 liability already facing an insider
and to underscore the unwieldy exposure to liability confronting a
defendant who has misused or misstated inside information. In short,
at present, there appears to be no single method by which the maximum, or even the minimum, limit of an insider's liability can be
determined.
RELATED ANTIFRAID PROVISIONS
Of course, section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 are not the only avenues
of enforcement available when insiders buy or sell securities on the
basis of information which is not publicly available, or when they
engage in fraudulent or misleading practices. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 193394 provides a private cause of action against a wide
variety of individuals95 involved in the preparation and issuance of a
92 For a discussion of the "strained" use of the common enterprise theory to impose
liability in Schelin, see Note, Common Law CorporateRecovery for Trading on Non-Public
Information, 74 COLu . L. REV. 269 (1974); Note, Inside Information-Common

Law

Liability, 48 ST. JoHN's L. RlEv. 415 (1973).
93 The RSrATEmENT (SEcoND) or AGENCY § 312 (1958), cited by the court in Schelin,
478 F.2d at 823-24, and the RSTATEENT or RESTrUTION § 201 (1936) require a finding of

a profit made by the defendants.

94 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).

95 Individuals who may be held liable include (1) every person who signed the registration statement (including, for example, a selling controlling stockholder); (2) every
person who was a director of or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part
of the registration statement with respect to which liability is asserted; (3)every person
named in the registration statement with his consent as currently being or about to
become a partner or director; (4) every accountant, engineer or other expert who has,
with his consent, been named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration
statement, with respect to that portion of the registration statement or report which was
certified by him; and (5) every underwriter with respect to such security. Securities Act
§ 11(a)(l)-(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)-(5) (1970).
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registration statement containing a materially false statement or an
omission of a material fact, and any purchaser acquiring a security
covered by such a registration may seek compensatory damages. 96 In
addition, any person who offers or sells a security through any means
of interstate commerce, by means of a prospectus or oral communication which includes an untrue statement of material fact or omits to
state a material fact, may be sued by the immediate purchaser under
section 12(2) of the Securities Act. 97 Section 17(a) of the Securities Act9"
is a general antifraud provision which prohibits the unlawful use of
interstate commerce to defraud purchasers of securities and is applicable whether or not the securities are registered. 99
Of more limited effect is section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,100 which provides for the recovery of any "short-swing"

profits gained by a corporate insider'' from a sale and purchase or
purchase and sale of the corporation's securities within a six-month
period. Suit may be brought by the issuer, shareholders of the corporation or even a subsequent purchaser of the corporation's stock. 102 However, not only does the statute limit enforcement to those companies
registered under the Securities Exchange Act, 03 but the limited time
span during which the insider's actions will create liability and the
failure to include the liability of tippees make section 16(b) a less
effective tool than the all-encompassing rule 1Ob-5.
There is obviously a good deal of overlap among all the sections,
and many actions for fraud will allege violations of rule lOb-5 as well
as one or more of the other sections. Accordingly, although a defrauded
seller may be limited to a lOb-5 action, certain defrauded purchasers
may maintain actions under lOb-5 as well as under the less extensive
sections 11, 12(2), or 17(a) of the 1933 Act. 04 It should be further
96 Securities Act §§ 11(e), (g), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), (g) (1970). See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
97 15
98 Id.

U.S.C.

§ 771(2) (1970).

§ 77q(a).

99 Id. § 77q(c).
lood. § 78p(b).
101 For the purposes of this section, only officers, directors and ten percent shareholders are considered "insiders". Id. § 78p(a).
'102Id. § 78p(b). See, e.g., Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 1016 (1954); Benisch v. Cameron, 81 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
103 Securities Exchange Act §§ 16(a), (b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(a), (b) (1970).
104 One such example may involve a false registration statement which would also
give rise to an action under lOb-5. Proceeding in this manner may avoid section l's
comparatively short statute of limitations. The outside time limit on a section 11 fraud
action is three years, Securities Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970), whereas the statute of
limitations on a lob-5 action is determined by that of the jurisdiction in which the federal
court sits. See note 125 and accompanying text infra. On the other hand, if lOb-5 is used
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noted that, in addition to damage awards, sanctions for violation of
section 17(a) and rule lOb-5 can include injunctive action by the
SEC, 05 criminal penalties, 106 suspension or revocation of a brokerdealer's license, 0 7 expulsion or suspension from the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), l0 s and suspension or expulsion
from a national stock exchange. 10 9
Tim ERA oF

ANTICIPATION

In view of the expanding potential for liability under rule 10b-5,
anticipation of when difficulties may arise is the key to compliance
with the rule, as well as the other antifraud provisions. Any significant
future or pending corporate action, such as underwritings, mergers,
acquisitions, contract negotiations, licensing arrangements, and new
discoveries or inventions may present problems involving the content,
timing, and efficacy of disclosures. When events such as these are in
the offing, management would be well-advised to seek the advice of
counsel in determining the potential lOb-5 implications. Even when
corporate action is in the planning stages, consideration should be
given immediately to the nature and timing of the public disclosure
of the proposed actions.
Nonetheless, under certain circumstances, a company, its directors
and officers may find it necessary to withhold information. If a corporation is engaged in research and development of new products, it
may be advantageous, for competitive reasons, not to announce any
breakthroughs until the product is fully ready for marketing. A further
conflict may arise in connection with preliminary negotiations on merger agreements. Acquisitions or reorganizations are often kept confidential to prevent fluctuations in the price of the corporation's securities. Once again, a course of action dictated by business strategy must
be balanced against the legal requirements of full and timely disclosure
imposed by lOb-5.
An insider who becomes aware of such material information is
faced with the dilemma that no shares may be sold without full andin such a situation, the plaintiff may be required to prove scienter rather than mere

negligence as permitted in the pure section 11 action. See Stewart v. Bennett, 359 F. Supp.

878 (D. Mass. 1978).

105 Securities Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1970). Securities Exchange Act § 21(e), 15
U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970).
106 Securities Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970). Securities Exchange Act § 32, 15 U.S.C.

§ 78ff (1970).
107 Securities Exchange Act § 15(b)(5), 15 US.C. § 78o(b) (1970).
1081d. §§ 15 A(1), (2)(A)-(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(0.
109 Id. § 19(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(3).
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prompt disclosure, even though disclosure is either impracticable or
competitively disadvantageous. In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith,110 the Second Circuit may have eased the insider's
quandary by holding that "[a]nyone in possession of material information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled
from disclosing it .... must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside information remains
undisclosed." ' Responding to the problem facing corporate insiders
as to when they may trade in their own securities without incurring
liability under rule lOb-5, the New York Stock Exchange has set forth
112
the following guidelines:
(1) A consistent periodic investment program administered by a
broker would not create liability.
(2) Buying or selling motivated by information included in an
annual report within a thirty-day period starting one week
after annual reports have been sent out can be done without
incurring liability.
(3)An insider should avoid buying or selling prior to the happening of a major development.
"Outside" directors may face similar problems in connection with
securities transactions effected by the issuer of which they may be directors. The Second Circuit, sitting en banc, held in Lanza v. Drexel
& Co., 11 by a narrow margin, that a member of the board of directors
of the BarChris Construction Corporation was not liable in damages
to plaintiffs who had received BarChris securities in exchange for stock
in the acquired company. Notwithstanding the director's knowledge
of the "substantial difficulties" 1 4 BarChris was experiencing, the court
found that he was not responsible for the failures of BarChris management to make proper disclosure to the company to be acquired. The
court concluded that
a director in his capacity as a director (a non-participant in the
transaction) owes no duty to insure that all material, adverse infor110 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
"ll Id. at 236, citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
112 NEw YoP K STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., CoMPANY MANuAL A-25 (Supp. 1971).
113 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
114 The 1960 annual report, the 1961 debenture prospectus and the BarChris financial
statement for the first half of 1961 failed to disclose anticipated losses of BarChris resulting from a failure to recoup unsecured loans from its customers. The director, one Coleman, became aware of these problems; however, he never realized their extent nor that
the information was being concealed from the company to be acquired. Id. at 1283-89.
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mation is conveyed to prospective purchasers of the stock of the
Corporation on whose board he sits. 115
However, the Delaware District Court, in Gould v. American Hawaiian
Steamship Co.,"" held three "outside" directors of an issuer liable for
material omissions from its proxy statement. Apparently, this court
does not agree that an outside director has no responsibility to insure
that all material information is accurately conveyed.
Moreover, in view of the closeness of the vote in Lanza, it is
conceivable that future decisions will begin to take into account such
factors as experience, knowledge, relationship to the corporation and

its officers, and involvement in its affairs in determining potential liability for outside directors. It may be unrealistic to hold that an outside director does not have an affirmative duty to investigate or inquire
about the conduct of the officers of the corporation with respect to
compliance with lOb-5.11 7 Accordingly, the director may have a duty
to do more than simply approve the transaction. As with inside directors and officers, he must anticipate, and, upon finding problems,

he would be well-advised to disclose.
Turning to tipper-tippee liability, if investment decisions or any
information that may affect the price of securities cannot be fully
disclosed to the general public, no disclosure whatsoever should be
made except to those persons who are required to know by virtue of
115 Id. at 1289.
116 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972). The court easily found a duty to accurately disclose material information and the only significant issue was whether a standard of negligence or scienter should apply to establish a breach of the director's duty under § 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). Since the court found
negligence the applicable standard, 351 F. Supp. at 864-65, the Gould decision may be
especially appropriate in those jurisdictions purporting to maintain a negligence standard
for 10b-5 actions. See text accompanying notes 43-53 supra. See also SEC v. National Sec.,
Inc, 393 U.S. 4553 (1969), where the Court rejected the contention that § 10(b) did not
cover proxy material.
Respondents' . . . argument that Rule 10b-5 does not cover misrepresentations
which occur in connection with proxy solicitations can be dismissed rather
quickly... .[T]he existence or non-existence of regulation under § 14 would
not affect the scope of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. . . . Section 10(b) applies to all
proscribed conduct in connection with a purchase or sale of any security; § 14
applies to all proxy solicitations, whether or not in connection with a purchase
or sale. The fact that there may well be some overlap is neither unusual nor
unfortunate.
Id. at 468.
117 In one of the dissenting opinions in Lanza, Judge Hays concluded that the outside director should have been held liable on the grounds that his financial sophistication,
taken together with his awareness of the increasing difficulties of BarChris, should have
made him vigilant enough to at least inquire whether the company being acquired was
fully informed. 479 F.2d at 1318-19 (Hays, J., dissenting). Indeed, another dissenter believed that the facts even demonstrated that the outside director "acted in reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at 1320 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
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their positions in the corporation. Once some outsiders become aware
of this information through tips or other leaks, the temptation of these
outsiders to trade in the securities of the corporation may be too great
to withstand. Since the corporation and the insider responsible for
the leak may be liable under rule lOb-5 for violations by such tippees,
one must anticipate the potential problem and take precautionary
measures. In addition, any disclosures which are made must be factually correct and given the widest possible dissemination. To insure
compliance, this may well be best accomplished through news releases
to wire services, financial newspapers and, perhaps, selected metropolitan newspapers.
Counsel must do much more than anticipate clients' noncompliance with rule lOb-5, since it appears that attorneys can be held individually liable as "insiders.""" It is thus possible that an attorney may
be required to reveal to the other party to a transaction, traditionally
considered to be at arm's length, information formerly considered confidential. While it is difficult to say whether, as a matter of public
policy, this is a wise development, it is not difficult to recognize that
attorneys must now anticipate the consequences of their own as well
as their clients' actions in a securities transaction covered by rule lOb-5.
The Second Circuit, in SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd.,"19 noted that the
legal profession "plays a unique and pivotal role in the effective implementation of the securities laws.' 120 Thus, even the opinions of
counsel concerning the legality of the issue' 2' may raise the question
of counsel's responsibility for the accuracy of the document and liability under rule lOb-5.122 As the Spectrum court commented:
The public trust demands more of its legal advisers than 'customary'
activities which prove to be careless. And, to be sure, where expediency precludes thorough investigation, an attorney can prevent
the illicit use of his opinion letter by prohibiting its utilization in
the sale of unregistered securities by a23statement to that effect dearly
appearing on the face of the letter.
To minimize this risk even further, the counsel named in a prospectus should anticipate potential liability and carefully specify that
his participation was limited to passing on the legality of the issue as
118 See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.

119 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
120 Id. at 542.
121 An opinion of counsel concerning the legality of the issue must appear as an

exhibit to the registration statement and the name of counsel must also appear in the
prospectus. Securities Act §§ 7, 10(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(g), (j) (1970).
122 Cheek, Counsel Named in a Prospectus, 6 Rnv. oF Sc. REG. 939 (1973).
123 489 F.2d at 542.
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a matter of local corporate law. An additional consideration may include the elimination of the firm name from the cover of the prospectus. The firm name should only be included under the "Legal
Opinion" heading as preferred over "Legal Matters" which may be
too broad.
Of course, defenses to actions for violations of rule lOb-5 might
involve claims that the substantive elements required for an action,
such as reliance, materiality, causation, or the existence of a transaction are lacking. However, as has been discussed, it is difficult to prepare a defense on such elusive grounds. In some circumstances, one
may rely on the equitable defenses of laches, waiver, and estoppel.' 24
In other cases, perhaps a claim can be made that the statute of linitations has run. Yet, even the statute of limitations fails to provide
a standardized defense for delinquent insiders. Not only are lOb-5 actions governed by the statute of limitations for fraud in each applicable
state jurisdiction, but the tolling of the statute may vary with the actions of each individual plaintiff.

25

CONCLUSION

As the requirements and scope of section 10(b) and rule lob-5
are formulated with each judicial decision, potential liability must be
accepted as a given for all involved in a securities transaction. The necessity of anticipation has become more than a euphemism. Corporate
directors, officers, brokers, attorneys, and others must anticipate when
they may become insiders, what they must disclose and how, and when,
if at all, they may trade in corporate securities. While it may be impossible to anticipate with precision every conceivable situation which
may give rise to liability, the expanding scope of lOb-5 and the increasing level of recoverable damages makes such anticipation imperative.
124 See, e.g., Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1962),
aff'd on remand, 333 F.2d 568 (1964), where the court held that a rescission action was
subject to the traditional equitable defenses of waiver, laches and estoppel. See also
Walpert v. Bart, 280 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Md. 1967). For a discussion of the use of tradi-

tional remedies incorporated in lOb-5, see Weiskopf, Remedies Under Rule 10b-5, 45 ST.
JoHN's L. REV. 733 (1971).
125 See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
See generally Bateman & Keith, Statutes of Limitations Applicable to Private Actions
Under SEC Rule 10b-5: Complexity in Need of Reform, 39 Mo. L. Rv. 165 (1974).

